Beyond Provincial Boundaries: The Philosophical and Economic Imperative of Administrative Reform in Pakistan

Karachi illustrates this contradiction with particular clarity. As Pakistan’s largest city, principal seaport and a major centre of banking, industry, commerce, logistics, media and professional services, Karachi generates a substantial share of the country’s economic activity and plays a central role in national revenue collection. Yet the city’s population of approximately 20.38 million in the 2023 census places extraordinary demands on infrastructure and public administration. Its problems are not confined to traffic congestion, deteriorating roads, inadequate drainage, water shortages, waste management or an expanding housing deficit. They reflect a deeper institutional fragmentation in which responsibilities are distributed among provincial departments, municipal bodies, development authorities, cantonment boards and federal land-management organisations. When multiple authorities exercise overlapping powers without a unified metropolitan framework, planning becomes inconsistent, public accountability becomes difficult to establish, and infrastructure projects may fail to complement one another. A road can be constructed without adequate drainage, housing can expand without sufficient public transport, and industrial development can proceed without the coordinated provision of water, sanitation and environmental protection. Karachi therefore requires more than additional funding or isolated development schemes. It needs a metropolitan governance system with clearly defined jurisdiction, professional planning capacity, transparent finances and democratically accountable leadership.

Administrative reform must, however, avoid the assumption that creating smaller provinces automatically produces better governance. A smaller administrative unit may bring citizens closer to decision-makers, improve the monitoring of public services and make development priorities easier to identify. It may also allow neglected regions to articulate their economic and cultural needs without depending entirely on distant provincial capitals. Yet smaller provinces can reproduce the same inequalities, patronage networks, bureaucratic inefficiencies and political centralisation found in larger ones. New capitals, secretariats, legislatures and administrative departments would require substantial expenditure, while disputes could emerge over public debt, government employees, assets, water resources and the distribution of federal revenues. The appropriate question is therefore not simply how many provinces Pakistan should have, but what scale of administration best serves each geographical, economic and social reality. One proposal is to divide each existing province into four first-tier governments, creating sixteen provinces and reducing the average population per unit from roughly 60 million to approximately 15 million. This could be examined as one scenario among several, alongside strengthening local governments, establishing metropolitan authorities and creating more effective district administrations. Such alternatives should be evaluated through demographic evidence, fiscal modelling, public consultation and independent institutional assessments rather than political expediency.

The experiences of other countries demonstrate that administrative geography can evolve alongside population growth and economic transformation. Nigeria developed from a small number of regional structures into a federation of 36 states, while Indonesia has expanded to 38 provinces. Kenya replaced its eight provincial administrations with 47 county governments under the 2010 Constitution, with devolution implemented following the 2013 elections. Brazil also offers lessons in the distribution of responsibilities among federal, state and municipal governments. These experiences do not establish a universal ideal number of administrative units, nor do they prove that territorial subdivision alone guarantees development. Their significance lies in demonstrating that large, diverse societies can adapt their institutional arrangements to improve representation and manage regional differences. Pakistan must draw lessons from these systems without mechanically copying them. Its own constitutional framework, linguistic diversity, fiscal constraints, security requirements, settlement patterns and history of centralisation must determine the appropriate model. Comparative experience is useful not because it supplies a ready-made blueprint, but because it challenges the assumption that existing boundaries are permanent or necessarily efficient.

The economic argument for administrative reform is equally compelling. Pakistan’s major cities are not merely centres of population; they are interconnected engines of productivity, innovation, investment and employment. Karachi’s ports and industrial zones support international trade and domestic supply chains, Lahore functions as a major centre of manufacturing, education, technology and services, while Faisalabad is closely associated with textiles and industrial production. Sialkot has established an international reputation in export-oriented manufacturing, Multan serves as an important commercial and agricultural centre, Peshawar connects regional markets and transport routes, and Quetta occupies a strategic position in Balochistan’s trade and regional connectivity. Hyderabad, Sukkur, Gujranwala and other urban centres also contribute to the national economy through manufacturing, agriculture-related industries, commerce and services. However, the economic potential of these cities is restricted when decisions concerning land use, public transport, taxation, industrial zoning, utilities and infrastructure maintenance are fragmented among institutions with competing priorities. Properly empowered city governments could coordinate investment, identify local economic opportunities, develop vocational training programmes and improve the conditions in which businesses operate. Better administration would not automatically generate prosperity, but it could reduce the institutional obstacles that prevent existing economic potential from becoming productive investment and decent employment.

Urban governance is also a question of social justice. Rapid urbanisation has created vast differences between neighbourhoods that enjoy reliable services and those where residents struggle for clean water, public transport, safe streets, schools and basic healthcare. Informal settlements frequently emerge because formal housing is unaffordable, land-use planning is weak and urban population growth exceeds the capacity of public institutions. When governments respond primarily through demolitions, temporary schemes or politically motivated development projects, they fail to address the structural causes of urban insecurity. A capable municipal administration must integrate affordable housing, public transport, drainage, sanitation, parks, environmental protection and disaster preparedness into a coherent development strategy. It must also recognise that urban poverty is not confined to one ethnic, linguistic or regional community. Karachi, for example, is home to people of diverse backgrounds, including Sindhi, Urdu-speaking Muhajir, Pashtun, Punjabi, Baloch, Seraiki and other communities. Its social and economic future depends on a civic framework in which access to services and political participation are determined by citizenship and legal rights rather than ethnicity, wealth or political affiliation. Administrative reform should strengthen this shared urban citizenship rather than institutionalise new forms of exclusion.

Rural administration deserves equal attention because decentralisation cannot become a synonym for urban development alone. Pakistan’s agricultural regions, small towns and peripheral districts face challenges involving irrigation, land ownership, agricultural productivity, market access, education, healthcare and the influence of entrenched local elites. In many areas, citizens must travel considerable distances to access administrative offices, while decisions about agricultural support, infrastructure and public services are taken far from the communities affected. Effective tehsil and taluka administrations could help farmers obtain information about markets, access agricultural extension services, register land disputes, connect with digital platforms and benefit from local infrastructure programmes. District-level planning could also identify the specific requirements of livestock production, water conservation, small-scale industry and rural transport. Nevertheless, local government must not become an instrument through which powerful landlords, contractors or political families consolidate control over public resources. Meaningful decentralisation requires elected representation, transparent procurement, accessible grievance mechanisms, independent audits and protections for marginalised citizens. Rural development and urban development are not competing objectives: productive agricultural regions need connected markets and thriving towns, while cities depend on reliable food systems, water resources and regional supply chains. A successful administrative settlement must therefore plan urban and rural territories as interconnected economic and social systems.

The financial dimension of reform cannot be postponed until after new boundaries have been drawn. Pakistan’s provinces remain heavily dependent on transfers from the federal government, while their own-source revenue collection remains limited relative to the scale of their responsibilities. Figures cited in the administrative reform debate put provincial tax collection at approximately Rs983 billion in the 2024–25 financial year, amounting to less than 0.9 per cent of GDP. Agriculture presents a further challenge: despite contributing roughly one-quarter of national value added, its effective taxation has historically remained low, although the exact figures depend on the methodology and year used. These realities point towards the need for stronger provincial and local revenue systems, not merely the redistribution of existing funds. Property taxation, agricultural income taxation, better valuation of urban land, improved business registration and modern digital tax administration could expand the resources available for public services, provided that the burden is distributed fairly and enforcement does not become arbitrary. The Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment strengthened provincial autonomy, while the Seventh National Finance Commission Award increased the provinces’ collective share of the divisible federal tax pool from 47.5 per cent to 56 per cent in the first year and 57.5 per cent thereafter. Any future restructuring must build upon this constitutional and fiscal history by clarifying how federal transfers, provincial revenues and local allocations will be shared. New administrative units without predictable revenue, expenditure controls and professional financial management would risk creating additional layers of dependency rather than improving governance.

The constitutional and political dimensions of this transformation require equal seriousness. Under Article 239(4) of Pakistan’s Constitution, a bill seeking to alter the limits of a province cannot be presented to the President for assent unless it has been passed by the provincial assembly of that province by a two-thirds majority of its total membership. This requirement makes provincial boundary changes a matter of constitutional negotiation rather than unilateral administrative decision. Any proposal for new provinces must therefore involve provincial representatives, parliamentarians, local governments, civil society, business organisations, academic institutions and the communities directly affected. Questions concerning capital cities, public employment, institutional assets, language rights, natural resources and fiscal entitlements must be addressed through transparent procedures. Equally important is the reform of cantonment administrations and federal land-management arrangements within urban areas, where fragmented planning can obstruct integrated metropolitan development. Their institutional roles should be reviewed through lawful, consultative processes to improve coordination with elected municipal authorities. The objective must be to establish a constitutional settlement in which administrative efficiency, provincial autonomy, local democracy and national cohesion reinforce one another instead of becoming competing political demands.

The most consequential reform, however, would be the creation of a genuinely empowered third tier of government. The Eighteenth Amendment and the Seventh NFC Award strengthened provincial autonomy, but devolution from the federation to the provinces does not necessarily mean devolution to citizens. Article 140A of the Constitution requires each province to establish a local government system and devolve political, administrative and financial responsibility and authority to elected local representatives. The challenge is to turn this principle into a durable institutional reality. Cities, districts, tehsils and union-level administrations need clearly defined functions, predictable financial allocations, professional civil services and the authority to make decisions within their legal mandates. Metropolitan governments should be capable of coordinating transportation, water supply, waste management, land use, housing and environmental planning across their functional urban regions, while local councils should remain accessible to neighbourhoods and communities. Police accountability, municipal taxation, infrastructure maintenance and public procurement also require transparent systems that citizens can scrutinize. Performance should be measured not by the number of development projects announced or foundation stones laid, but by improvements in school attendance, healthcare access, water availability, mobility, public safety and the quality of life. A government becomes accountable when the citizen knows which institution is responsible, how its budget is spent and where to seek redress when it fails.

Ultimately, the question of administrative units is a philosophical question about the purpose of the state. Max Weber’s analysis of bureaucracy reminds us of the importance of defined authority, professional competence and predictable rules, while Amartya Sen’s capability approach directs attention towards the real freedoms people possess to live healthy, educated and dignified lives. Hannah Arendt’s reflections on political participation also invite us to consider whether citizens are merely governed or genuinely enabled to participate in shaping their common world. From these perspectives, administrative boundaries are not ends in themselves; they are instruments through which political authority can be made more humane, effective and accountable. Pakistan should establish an independent, evidence-based framework to assess alternative provincial configurations, strengthen municipal institutions, modernize district administration and ensure equitable fiscal transfers. It should publish demographic and economic assessments, consult affected communities and introduce measurable performance standards before implementing irreversible changes. Above all, reform must recognize that Karachi’s metropolitan challenges, Lahore’s population pressures, Baluchistan’s geographical distances, the needs of smaller towns and the demands of rural communities cannot be resolved through a single administrative formula. The ultimate objective is a state in which no citizen is too distant to be heard, no city is too economically important to be neglected, and no rural community is too peripheral to receive public investment. Pakistan does not simply need more administrative units; it needs a new philosophy of governance in which power follows responsibility, resources follow need, and accountability follows authority. Only then can administrative reform become a foundation for economic growth, social justice, democratic citizenship and a more cohesive national future.